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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
•. * 
KENT WALTER BINGHAM, : Case No. 950109-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are 
provided in full at addendum A to this Brief: 
United States Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1. 
Utah Constitution, article I, § 24. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1310 (1993 Repl.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3) (1995 Repl.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
Point I: Whether the prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges to strike an African-American juror and Hispanic juror 
violated equal protection under Article I, § 24 of the Utah 
Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
Standard of Review - Mixed Question of Law and Fact 
1 
The standard of review adopted by this Court in State v. 
Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App. 1993), is one of a mixed 
question of fact and law: 
The trial court's conclusion as to whether or not a 
prima facie case was established is a legal conclusion 
which [this Court] will review for correctness, 
according it no particular deference. [] The factual 
findings of the trial court relevant to allegedly 
discriminatory peremptory challenges merit deference on 
appeal and will be set aside only if they are clearly 
erroneous. [] This court, however, will review the 
sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact for 
correctness. (citations omitted) 
Therefore, the trial court's underlying factual findings are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but its 
determination on whether a prima facie case is shown and whether 
the State has rebutted that prima facie case is reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
Under the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), and State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 
(Utah 1994), questions that are not pure fact or pure law issues 
merit further discussion. In Vincent, the court stated: 
The basic teaching of our recent standard-of-review 
cases is twofold. Findings of pure fact are uniquely 
within the province of the trial court and will not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous. [] On the other 
hand, the legal effect of those facts, or differently 
phrased, their normative consequence, is the province 
of the appellate courts, and no deference need be given 
a trial court's resolution of such questions of law. [] 
Nevertheless, policy considerations may occasionally 
lead us to define, as a matter of appellate court 
grace, a legal standard so that it actually grants some 
operational discretion to the trial courts applying it. 
883 P.2d at 281-82 (citations omitted). This rule was explained 
in Pena using the "pasture11 metaphor proposed by Professor 
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Rosenberg in the context of a reasonable suspicion issue:: 
Returning to our earlier metaphor, the appellate court 
reviews for correctness the placement of the legal 
fences which delimit the pasture of trial court 
discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable 
suspicion. The decision when to create and where to 
place these fences is an issue of law, and no deference 
is accorded to the trial court. Not every case that 
reaches an appellate court, however, must result in 
establishment of a fence. 
Id. at 939-40 n. 5. 
The court delineated a number of factors to be used in 
making that determination. First, the court examines the 
complexity and variety of the facts to which the legal standard 
will be applied. The greater the complexity and variety, the 
greater the "likelihood that no rule can be spelled out that will 
adequately address the relevance of all these facts to the legal 
standard." 883 P.2d at 282. The second factor is the extent of 
experience the appellate court has with particular fact 
situations to which the legal rule will be applied. "Third, the 
more the application of a legal rule depends on facts that the 
trial judge is uniquely able to evaluate, such as credibility, 
the less the likelihood that an appellate court can effectively 
review the application of the law to those facts on a cold 
record." Id. The fourth and "countervailing factor" is the 
"strength of the policy that the legal rule is designed to 
vindicate and the need for uniformity in the application of that 
policy in the trial courts." Id. (emphasis added). 
Applying the first factor, the complexity and variety of the 
facts upon which courts must decide Batson type objections, 
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courts require the trial court to establish a detailed record for 
appellate review. Pharris. 846 P.2d at 459. While some 
deference must necessarily be given to any credibility 
determinations, the facts underlying the jury selection are 
easily reviewable. The first factor therefore falls on the side 
of a stricter Mde novo" review. 
Appellate courts regularly review Batson challenges. See 
e.g.. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Young. 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 
(Utah 1991); State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) ("Cantu 
I"); State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II") ; State 
v. Macial. 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1993); Pharris; State v. 
Harris. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991). Moreover, appellate 
courts in Utah are well able to set a detailed legal standard for 
Batson challenges. Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518-19 (adopting a 
detailed list of factors to apply to Batson challenges). The 
second factor in Pena therefore also suggests a strict "de novo" 
review. 
Assuming the trial court ensures an adequate record as 
required by Pharris. an appellate court can easily examine the 
record and apply the legal rules for peremptory challenges. As 
such, the third Pena factor strongly suggests "de novo" review. 
Finally, the strength of the rule against discrimination 
during peremptory challenges is strong and requires uniformity in 
its application. Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (emphasizing the strong policy against 
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discrimination in judicial proceedings). As all four Pena 
factors fall on the side of Mde novo" review, this court should 
adopt a correction of error standard of review that allows little 
deference to the trial court's ultimate determinations of whether 
a prima facie case of discrimination was established and whether 
the State provided a legitimate race neutral explanation 
rebutting the prima facie case. 
Preservation of The Issue for Review 
The issue was preserved by defense counsel's timely 
objection to the peremptory challenges of Mr. Sampson and Ms. 
Gonzales, on the basis that they were racially motivated, citing 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 
(1986), Cantu I. and Cantu II. as support. R. 230. As discussed 
in Point I below, Cantu II adopted a test for Batson type 
challenges under Utah equal protection which is independent from 
federal equal protection law. The trial court overruled the 
objection, finding a race neutral reason for the peremptory 
challenges. R. 233-34. 
Point II: Whether the prosecutor1s misstatement of the law 
concerning unlawful control over a motor vehicle probably 
influenced the jury and denied Mr. Bingham his constitutional 
right to a fair trial. 
Standard of Review — Correctness 
This Court reviews whether a prosecutor misstated the law 
during argument and whether the misstatement probably influenced 
the jury as a question of law, affording no deference to the 
5 
trial court's determination. State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554-
55 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (1993); State v. 
Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990). 
Preservation of Issue for Review 
This issue was preserved by counsel's immediate objection to 
the State's alleged mischaracterization of the law. The trial 
court overruled the objection. R. 352-53. 
Point III: Whether Mr. Bingham's constitutional right to be 
tried with a presumption of innocence was denied by the trial 
court's denial of his motion for mistrial when during jury 
selection, a potential juror discussed having seen Mr. Bingham 
appear before a different court in jail clothes. 
Standard of Review — Correctness 
The question of whether a defendant's rights to a fair trial 
are infringed by jury influence from observing a defendant in 
jail clothes or shackles has been reviewed by this court as a 
matter of law and have accorded no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993); Chess 
v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). 
Preservation of Issue for Review 
The issue was preserved by defense counsel's timely motion 
for a mistrial, made during jury selection on the basis that the 
jury was influenced by statements from a prospective juror, Ms. 
DeRosier, that she had recently seen Mr. Bingham in jail clothes 
appearing before another court. The trial court denied the 
motion. R. 234-236. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Bingham was charged by information on September 29, 
1994, with one count of Theft By Receiving Stolen Property, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953 as amended), a 
Second Degree Felony, and one count of Unlawful Possession Of 
Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-5 
(1953 as amended), a class B misdemeanor. R. 8-10. Upon a trial 
by jury, Mr. Bingham was found guilty on both counts. R. 150-51. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Bingham on count I, Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, to a term of one to fifteen years at 
the Utah State Prison, a fine of $5000 and a surcharge of $4250. 
R. 156. On count II, Mr. Bingham was sentenced concurrently to 
six months in jail, a fine of $500 and a surcharge of $425. R. 
157. Mr. Bingham filed a timely notice of appeal on February 6, 
1995. R. 161-62. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
A. Jury Selection 
During jury selection, in response to a question from the 
trial judge, Ms. DeRosier, a potential juror, described for the 
entire jury venire an incident where she had seen the defendant a 
few weeks earlier as he was appearing before another court for a 
"pretrial": 
Judge Young: Thank you. Are any of you acquainted with Mr. 
Mauro [counsel for Mr. Bingham] or Mr. Bingham, if so, would you 
raise your hand? 
Mr. Bingham does contest his conviction of count II, 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and therefore recites 
only the facts relevant to count I. 
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There appears to be no affirmative response. 
Oh, yes, Ma'am. You are Ms. DeRosier. With whom are you 
acquainted? 
Ms. DeRosier: I just saw Mr. Bingham at like a pre-trial a 
couple of weeks ago out in West Valley. I was just there in the 
courtroom. 
Judge Young: And are your acquainted with him in any way? 
Ms. DeRosier: No, I just— 
Judge Young: Just by coincidence you saw him, perhaps, in a 
proceeding relating to this, only an earlier proceeding; is that 
correct? 
Ms. DeRosier: Well, I don't know whether it is related to 
this case or not. It's where they go up and ask whether you're 
guilty or not guilty. He had a pre-trial. 
Judge Young: It's probably an arraignment. And so an 
earlier proceeding. It's curious to me, that among the many 
people whom you would see there, why you would remember Mr. 
Bingham. Can you tell us how it is that you remember one person 
out of that group? Are you acquainted with Mr. Bingham? 
Ms. DeRosier: H, Huh-uh. Not at all. No. I just remember 
his face. 
Judge Young: You remember his face? 
Ms. DeRosier: He was dressed in — I guess they kept a few 
of 'em overnight in jail. 
Judge Young: Uh-huh. 
R. 198-200. In response, defense counsel asked to approach the 
bench. At the conclusion of the bench conference, the trial 
court gave the prospective jurors the following instruction: 
Occasionally, During the course of a trial, courts will 
have a request made of the court to make a conference 
at the sidebar. That conference is normally not on the 
record, however, at the request of the parties, the 
court will reserve their right to make a record of the 
discussion at the sidebar. 
In relation to that discussion I will simply tell 
you that there were concerns that were raised regarding 
the response of Ms. DeRosier in relation to having seen 
Mr. Bingham previously in artother court. Let me 
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explain to all of you as jurors that before, well 
before a matter comes to trial a defendant accused of 
an offense is arrested, is brought before the circuit 
court for, initially, an arraignment, they may well be 
in custody at the time that they are brought before 
that court, they may well be in jail apparel at the 
time they are brought before that court. They may well 
have spent a night in the county jail. That is not 
exactly the best groomery for someone to look their 
best as they might come to court the following morning. 
None of those events could be presumed by anyone to 
relate to whether or not they committed the crime. 
Whether or not is redundant, but whether they committed 
the crime. And it would be very likely that Mr. 
Bingham's proceedings, observed by Ms. DeRosier, were 
entirely related solely to this case and none of you 
could presume that it would be related to anything 
else. It could have been, but for the purposes of this 
case you may certainly not assume that it was, it was 
simply related to this case. We don't accuse someone 
of a crime and then convict 'em on the basis of a 
coincidental appearance in a prior court. The crime is 
based upon the facts of the case. 
If there is anyone who would be inclined to 
consider Mr. Bingham is in any way jeopardized by the 
fact that Ms[.] DeRosier states that she likely saw him 
before in another court in a prior proceeding, would 
you raise your hand? 
There appears to be no affirmative response to 
that. 
R. 201-02. 
Defense counsel requested a mistrial on the grounds that Ms. 
DeRosier had announced to the prospective jurors that she had 
seen Mr. Bingham at a prior proceeding, in jail clothes, and that 
the jury would be effected by that. R. 234-36. The trial judge 
denied the motion for mistrial. R. 236. 
Defense counsel also objected to the State's use of two 
peremptory challenges to strike an African-American juror and a 
Hispanic juror, on the basis that the were racially motivated. 
Defense counsel cited cases in support of its objections: Batson 
v. Kentucky and the two State v. Cantu cases from the Utah 
9 
Supreme Court.2 R. 230. The prosecutor offered an explanation 
for the strikes which he claimed were not related to any racial 
motivation. R. 231-33. As for Mr. Sampson, who the State agreed 
was African-American, the State claimed to have struck him due to 
his stated concerns over his new employment and that jury service 
would be a hardship. R. 231. The State claimed to have struck 
Ms. Gonzales, a Hispanic person, due to her lack of post high 
school education and employment in food service. R. 231-32. The 
prosecutor claimed that because of the nature of the case, he 
believed better educated jurors would more easily grasp the legal 
concepts involved. The prosecutor also cited his observation 
that Ms. Gonzales' answers were "a bit slow and halting, . . . ." 
Id. 
The trial judge ruled: 
I find that the exercise of the challenge has been race 
neutral. The Defendant in this case is Anglo. We 
don't have a defendant that is racially different than 
the total panel of the jury and the court finds that 
the explanation of the State in relation to the two 
jurors, Sampson and Gonzales, has been adequate and 
that they are entitled to exercise their challenges on 
that basis. 
R. 234. 
B. Evidence Adduced at Trial 
On September 25, 1994, between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m., Jackie 
Redmon drove her vehicle to the Corner Stop Express, located at 
2
 The transcript of the jury selection proceedings actually 
portrays counsel's citations as "Madsen v. Kentucky" and "the two, 
State v. Kent, two cases." As the United States Supreme court case 
Batson v. Kentucky, and the two State v. Cantu cases in Utah are 
well known and oft cited, counsel's citations were apparently 
incorrectly transcribed. 
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4790 West 3500 South, parked and went inside, leaving the keys in 
the ignition. R. 250-51. After being inside for a few minutes, 
Ms. Redmon returned to find her vehicle missing. R. 252. 
At approximately 1:50 a.m. the next morning, September 26, 
1994, Officer Shaffnit of the West Jordan Police Department 
spotted a vehicle driving erratically. As he followed the 
vehicle, it turned into a parking lot, a female passenger exited 
the vehicle and appeared to be upset. The vehicle parked in a 
stall, and in the process, bumped another vehicle with the 
passenger door. Officer Shaffnit stopped the vehicle and 
confronted the driver, who he identified at trial as Mr. Bingham. 
Officer Shaffnit testified that Mr. Bingham appeared to be 
"disoriented, confused and had a hard time understanding 
questions and orders." R. 259-63. Upon conducting a computer 
check of the vehicle, Officer Shaffnit determined it had been 
stolen and arrested Mr. Bingham. R. 264. 
Officer Hales, also from the West Jordan Police Department, 
assisted Officer Shaffnit with the incident. Officer Hales 
testified that he was called to go to a location at approximately 
6885 South 1700 West. Upon arriving at the location, Officer 
Hales conducted a computer check of the license plate on the 
vehicle. The license plate was an Idaho license plate and when 
checked, did not correspond to the vehicle. R. 271-74. During a 
search of the vehicle, Officer Hales found a Utah License plate 
in the front seat which corresponded to the subject vehicle. R. 
282. 
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Ms. Redmon was called to the scene at approximately 2:00 
a.m. and identified her vehicle. Ms. Redmon testified that she 
noticed that a "Z93 sticker" which was on her vehicle had been 
covered with some gold tape and a "skull sticker." R. 252-53. 
She also testified that a number of personal items, her car 
stereo and speakers were missing. Jd. Ms. Redmon testified that 
she did not inform Officer Hales or Shaffnit of the missing 
items. R. 297-98. 
At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel made a 
motion arguing that the evidence presented was not sufficient to 
prove the elements of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, and 
instead, only satisfied the elements of Unlawful Control of a 
Vehicle, a lesser included offense. Specifically, counsel argued 
that the evidence only proved an intent to "temporarily deprive" 
Ms. Redmon of her vehicle. The trial court denied the motion. 
R. 300-306. 
Mr. Bingham testified, admitting that he was a heroin addict 
and was suffering from withdrawals on the day Ms. Redmon's 
vehicle went missing. Mr. Bingham's vehicle had broken down and 
he was attempting to call a friend to pick him up from the 
telephone located at the same convenience store at which Ms. 
Redmon was parked. A female friend with Mr. Bingham saw that the 
keys were left in the vehicle in question and mentioned that fact 
to Mr. Bingham. Mr. Bingham and the female passenger then took 
the vehicle, intending to go to Pioneer Park and obtain some 
drugs. R. 313-322. 
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Mr. Bingham testified that he took the license plate off of 
Ms. Redmon's vehicle and put on the Idaho plate from his broken 
down car. He testified that he did this in order to avoid being 
identified and arrested when he went to Pioneer Park. He 
testified that he covered the lfZ93 sticker11 for the same reason. 
Mr. Bingham went to Pioneer Park and purchased heroin, then went 
to an apartment where he was staying at "4Oth West and 5300 
South." Upon arriving at the apartment, he injected some heroin 
and then attempted to drive his female friend to her home in 
Sugarhouse. R. 324-29. Mr. Bingham was pulled over and arrested 
while taking her home. He testified that it was his intention to 
abandon the vehicle close to where he was living after taking her 
home. R. 329. 
C. Closing Argument 
During Closing argument, the prosecutor made the following 
statement regarding the difference between Receiving Stolen 
Property, and the lesser included offense of Unlawful Control 
Over a Motor Vehicle: 
Now the joy-riding, which Mr. Bingham has basically 
admitted to, in fact, he has admitted to it, he told 
you that he intended to return that car—not return it, 
he was going to abandon it. So the element there, that 
on September the 25th, Kent Walter Bingham, exercised 
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle not his own, 
while in Salt Lake County. Absolutely. You heard him 
say that. 
. . . . 
But that's where he wants you to stop and that's 
where the people of the State of Utah don't want you to 
stop. We want you to look at No. 18 and come back with 
a verdict of guilty because he intended to deprive the 
owner of that motor vehicle. Why? How? First of all, 
as you heard me just explain, unlawful control over a 
motor vehicle in the legal jargon is called joy-riding. 
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Joy-riding is where# generally, a couple of kids see a 
motor vehicle, many cases just like this, at a 
convenience store, somebody's run in, left the motor 
running, the key's in there, they grab it, they drive 
over to a friend's house, they ride around town for a 
little bit and they abandon it within a 24-hour period. 
R. 351-52. Defense counsel immediately objected to the statement 
as being an incorrect statement of the law. R. 352. The trial 
court overruled defense counsel's objection: 
Well, he's arguing the application of those 
instructions. The objection's overruled. You can deal 
with that in your rebuttal argument. 
R. 352-53. 
During the jury's deliberation, the jury sent the following 
hand-written note to the court: 
Clarify 
(1) Is "permanent" [greater than or equal to] 24 hours? 
(2) how long is "extended period of time"? 
R. 146. The trial judge sent the following hand-written note 
back in response: 
You will have to rely on your best judgment & the 
instructions in the law. 
Is l ISI 
David S. Young 
R. 146. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State conceded that Mr. Bingham had established a prima 
facie case that peremptory challenges used by the State to strike 
an African-American and Hispanic juror were racially motivated. 
Utah has established law under equal protection applicable 
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to Batson challenges which is independent from federal equal 
protection analysis. Examined under the factors delineated in 
Cantu II, the State's explanation failed to rebut the prima facie 
case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Since no 
harmless error analysis is applicable, this Court should grant 
Mr. Bingham a new trial. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor misstated the law 
regarding the lesser included offense of unlawful control over a 
motor vehicle. The jury's note to the trial court during 
deliberation showed the probable influence which the misstatement 
had on the jury. Mr. Bingham was therefore denied the right to a 
fair trial and should be granted a new trial. 
During jury selection, a potential juror disclosed to the 
entire venire that she had recently seen Mr. Bingham in jail 
clothes as he appeared before another court. The trial court's 
denial of Mr. Bingham's motion for a mistrial denied Mr. Bingham 
his right to be tried with the presumption of innocence 
constitutionally required under Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 
501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO STRIKE TWO 
MINORITY JURORS VIOLATED EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE I, S 
24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
A. The State Conceded that Mr. Bingham Had Met His Burden 
of Shoving a Prima Facie Case 
Using a peremptory challenge to strike a juror based upon 
that juror's race violates equal protection. Batson v. Kentucky, 
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476 U.S. 79 (1986); State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) 
f"Cantu 11"). In order to attack the State's peremptory 
challenge, Mr. Bingham must first establish a prima facie case. 
"The burden then shifts to the [State] to show the existence of a 
racially neutral reason for the challenge." Cantu II. 778 P.2d 
at 518. The Utah Supreme Court has listed the elements necessary 
in establishing a prima facie case as the following: 
(1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a showing 
that persons excluded belong to a cognizable group . . 
. and (3) a showing that there exists "a strong 
likelihood that such persons are being challenged 
because of their group association rather than because 
of any specific bias." 
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994). The court noted 
that evidence that the State has struck most or all of the 
members of a minority group may be sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case. Id. at 457. 
In Mr. Bingham's case, however, the state failed to contest 
Mr. Bingham's establishment of a prima facie case and therefore 
this Court should presume that the defendant satisfied his burden 
and should examine the State's alleged race-neutral explanation. 
State v. Macial. 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1993) (court will 
presume a prima facie case if State fails to contest it). In 
fact, the State agreed that Mr. Bingham had demonstrated a prima 
facie case. In making Mr. Bingham's objection to the State's use 
of peremptory challenges, defense counsel stated: 
I think we've met the threshold showing that these 
people are minority members of the jury panel, they 
have been struck by the State on peremptory challenge. 
I think the burden then shifts to the State to show 
there is a race neutral explanation for striking Juror 
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No, v- Sampson, Juror " "" Gonzales. 
] i *v~ -~ 7p neutral 
reasons [ ; he State . ,negea i 
Young presumably agreed as wel], ruling only that the exercise of 
1,1M.! peremploj j i.lllli nil U'i'ifie'i < h v \ ivn " "' -?** '" Since 
the State failed to contest the matter, agreeing m a t tnex 
prima * -ie case, and the trial court implicitly agreed -*-
Ltiitii C; ... - is demonstrated and 
examine the State's asserted reasons for stinking the jurors. 
B. Examination of the State's Explanation Under Utah Equal 
Protection Law Demonstrates that It Was Pretextual in Nature and 
Not Race Neutral 
The equal protection, clause i n the fourteenth amendment 
I'm * i i;iPr".: 
Section 1. [Citizenship
 E ,, :l B j, r o c € s iS , : f j a ( , , E ^ ua j 
protection.] 
All persons born or
 naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, 
(I i uiause is found in 
3
 Where no findings appear I n the record, the court assumes 
the trial court found them in accordance with its decision, state 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991). 
The trial court's findings regarding the legitimacy of the 
prosecutor's proffered explanation, however, is a more difficult 
matter considering this Court's requirements in Pharris, 846 P.2d 
at 464-65, that a trial court make specific findings using the 
cri teria set out I n Cantu II. 
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Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution and provides: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
In Malan v. Lewis, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that 
the equal protection clause under the Utah Constitution differed 
in language from that found in the fourteenth amendment. 693 
P.2d 661# 670 (Utah 1984). While the court found that the Utah 
Constitution incorporates the same general principles as the 
equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment, the court 
stated: 
The different language of Article I, § 24, the 
different constitutional contexts of the two 
provisions, and different jurisprudential 
considerations may lead to a different result in 
applying equal protection principles under Article I, § 
24 than might be reached under federal law. 
693 P.2d at 670. The Malan court proceeded to find that Utah law 
had set a more restrictive standard when determining whether a 
statute was constitutional on equal protection grounds. Id. at 
670-71. Accord Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 
816 (Utah 1991) (applying separate equal protection analysis 
under the Utah Constitution). This independent state 
constitutional analysis was most recently applied by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State of Utah v. Asipeli Mohi. No. 940028, 
940200, 940201, Slip op. (Utah Supreme Court, June 15, 1995) 
(relying on Article I, § 24 and its independent equal protection 
analysis to invalidate the direct file provision in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-25). 
In Batson, the Supreme Court, relying on the equal 
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protection clause in the fourteenth amendment, required that -'-
order i • | i. iniii • party exercising the 
challenge must explain, clear, reasonably specific manner, 
legitimate, neutral reasons for his or liner challenges that are 
related . • 11 1 \ ' State v ., 
Pharris. 846 P.2d 4 A • (Utah App. 1993)1 (emphasis in 
oriqinai) (citing, Batson. 476 U.S. at 9<i n Mil) in the recent 
case, Purkett. Superintendent, fcdimiiiulun Corrections Center y» 
Elem, l i Cr im, III.. R e p . (BNA) 3044 „ (IJ. S. Supreme Court Case N o . 
(-1 p., I'm, ] 'Per Curiam), the United States Supreme 
Court further explained the fedex all Il a i i aj: | Il :1 cab] c 1: .• :: • Batson t .ype 
challenges. The Court explained the steps under Batson; 
[0]nce the
 0 p p 0 n e n t ol d peremptory challenge has made 
out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step 
1 ) , the burden of production shifts to the proponent of 
the strike to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation (step 2 ) , If a race-neutral explanation is 
tendered, the trial court must then decide (step 3) 
whether the opponent of the strike has proved 
purposeful racial discrimination [] 
The second step of this process does i lot demand an 
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. "At 
this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the 
facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. 
Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed race neutral." [quoting, Hernandez v. New York, 
500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)] 
Elem at 3044, 
In "i ii11 Batson Ivypc? clia I I ,,i "" ah I" .", 
developed independent analysis upon equal
 H u . . c , u o n grounds, 
varying from federal equal protection law significant 
respects. 
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challenge, the Utah Supreme Court, in Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518-
19, adopted additional "criteria by which to judge the adequacy 
of a party's explanation of an allegedly racially motivated 
peremptory challenge." Pharris. 846 P.2d at 463. 
In adopting the additional criteria, the court listed 
factors which may "'cast doubt upon the legitimacy of a 
purportedly race-neutral explanation' because they 'tend to show 
that the state's reasons are not actually supported by the record 
or are an impermissible pretext' . . . " State v. Span. 819 P.2d 
329, 342 (Utah 1991). Those factors include: 
(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the 
juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or 
perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial 
court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, 
(3) singling the juror out for special questioning 
designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the 
prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the 
case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally 
applicable to juror[s] who were not challenged. 
Span. 819 P.2d at 342-43. In addition, the Cantu II court 
explained that after establishing a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the State to provide race neutral reasons for the 
contested peremptory challenges that are related to the case. 
778 P.2d at 518. If the State cannot meet its burden of 
establishing a viable race-neutral reason for either of the 
peremptory challenges, then Mr. Bingham's conviction must be 
reversed "without regard to the harmlessness of the 
constitutional error." Pharris. 846 P.2d at 459. 
In the present case, the State's explanation for striking 
Ms. Gonzales was: 
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Ms. Gonzales, because of the nature of this case, the 
nature of theft by receiving, the concept of theft by 
receiving, historically appears for prosecutors to be a 
difficult thing to explain to the jury, the concept is 
difficult for some of them to grasp. And the State 
believes that jurors who are better educated can 
understand the reasons that the State presents for 
concerning reasonable d o u b t — o r negating reasonable 
doubt and explaining the concept. It goes over the 
elements of the jury instruction. Ms. Gonzales, and 
this is in no way is to infer that people who are not 
well educated or appear to be brighter, cannot serve on 
juries, but this is a little bit more of a technical 
case. She has a high school education. She works in 
food service. I believe, for a school 
[Response by Judge Young]: Jordan. 
[State continues]: And her answers were a bit slow and 
halting, her speech pattern seemed to be that she had 
to think about things a little bit and the State was 
concerned whether she would be able to grasp what the 
State is going to present, particularly closing 
arguments. Again, race neutral reasons. 
R. 231-32, Defense counsel responded. 
Well, I would just dispute that the one, certainly with 
Ms. Gonzales, on whether education plays a role. There 
are a number of other jurors that have been selected 
that have only high school educations. And it would 
look like Ms. Kavelik, Juror No. 2, Mr. Fowlks, Juror 
No. 7, Ms. Davie, Juror No. 18, Ms. Ince, Juror No. 21. 
And that's the jury panel as it stands right now. 
The furthe r ex,p 1 a i ned: 
I was going to explain the different jobs they had with 
their high school education. If the combination of the 
high school education, the job, which Ms. Gonzales has, 
and the most important factor is the State's perception 
of her mental processes as she perceived the questions 
and manner she answered them. 
R 23 3. 
As for Mr, Sampson, the State's proffered reason was that he 
>^i stated - oncern over his new employment (h , ."08-2 09) and the 
w>'«"" |«,rd ' * "i*,"t 
commission The State therefore . concerned that Mr. Sampson 
would worry more about his job than the case. R. 231. 
Additionally, The State was concerned that Mr. Sampson had stated 
that he knew Andrew Valdez and Richard Uday (R. 223) at the Salt 
Lake Legal Defenders office. R. 231. The trial judge ruled: 
All right. Well, I've heard your arguments in respect 
to each. I find that the exercise of the challenge has 
been race neutral. The defendant in this case is 
Anglo. We don't have a defendant that is racially 
different than the total panel of the jury and the 
court finds that the explanation of the State in 
relation to the two jurors, Sampson and Gonzales, has 
been adequate and that they are entitled to exercise 
their challenges on that basis. 
R. 233-34. 
Even one single challenge based upon discrimination 
constitutes a violation of equal protection. Pharris, 846 P.2d 
at 465. It should be noted at the outset that the trial court's 
finding, here, that Mr. Bingham was anglo misapplied the law. Id 
(trial court's finding that defendant was not of the same 
minority race as the challenged juror was misplaced) . This Court 
explained in State v. Span that a person of any race may make a 
Batson challenge regardless of whether the defendant is a 
minority, so long as the subject juror is within a "cognizable 
racial group." 819 P.2d 329, 339-41 (Utah 1991) (holding that 
Powers v. Ohio. Ill S.Ct. 1364 (1991) had "clearly eliminated any 
standing requirement" to challenge discriminatory use of a 
peremptory challenge). Therefore, the district court's finding 
that Mr. Bingham is not of a minority race is irrelevant and 
misplaced. 
Applying the factors adopted in Cantu II to the State's 
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explanation for striking Ms. Gonzales, he *irst factor, whether 
the Stare . .. a jurors in 
question does . apply here as the ^\.+ .-= ,*a*A^ iivje was based 
i complex:*•* "^ **^ ^ase education i ability to 
understand 
The second factor, "failure to examine the juror or 
per*11 """»«"";• n'« \f examination, assuming neither the oourx nor 
opposing counsel had questioned 
Bingham's position that the State's proposed explanation was 
Il hi> f:i,ilt"" asked no questions of the jurors, 
relying only upon * court's generi *. • • 
At • - beginning <-s *.:;<- -*u: • ~n trial judge 
a s k e d ( , backcrround questions 
which vc * writu i> * ino pab.>^ .„ . 
response, Ms. Gonzalez stated: 
My n a m e ' s J udy Gonza les , i have j IIUJII s c h o o l 
education. I'm married. I work for Jordan School 
District in the food service department And I have 
two children and five grandchildren. 
lonzales also responded to tl le tr lal judge's Inquiry 
into prior jury servi ce of the potenti.r. -;.rors. Her total 
response was s 
been about years ago." , .wu^aies also responded 
uu the trial judge' inquire <"•* whethe; . potential juror had 
been 
broken into "a month ago rosecutor asked 
-uestions ^onzale*. '' ** information regarding 
T iiistor, n&r responsi 
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anything that would reasonably enlighten the State as to her 
ability to understand legal concepts. R. 228. Indeed, the State 
asked no questions of any of the venire members. 
As discussed below, since others that ultimately served on 
the jury had only high school educations, the State's reliance on 
Ms. Gonzales' brief statement becomes even more suspect. If the 
State was indeed concerned about her education and skills, it did 
not attempt to alleviate those concerns through any questions of 
her or others with only high school educations. The second 
factor, therefore, further indicates that the State's proffered 
explanation was a pretext. 
The third factor is whether the prospective juror was 
singled out for questioning to evoke a certain response. This 
factor does not apply either way in this case since the 
prosecutor asked no questions whatsoever of any of the jurors. 
The fourth factor, whether the prospective juror was 
challenged for a reason unrelated to the trial, again shows that 
the State's proffered reason was merely a pretext. Contrary to 
the prosecutor's suggestion, this case was a very simple one. 
The only real question the jury had to decide was whether the 
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bingham 
intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle, or 
whether it showed only that he had taken the vehicle temporarily. 
The evidence presented was brief and simple witness testimony, 
and included no complex factual situations or legal argument. 
The prosecutor's explanation, therefore, was not related to this 
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specific case and further exposes the pretextual nature of the 
perempt or y lA" r i lint"" 
The fifth and final factor, w h e t h c *:' L i di lie 11! Il tsi'iijed 
for reasons equally applicable jurors not similarly 
cliii! 1 1 ij"di.jc;:(J I.I I'lt-Thiifi i *1 liner indication of the State's 
pretext. Of the eight jurors who ultimately sat 
three had only high school educations. See Jury List 
: worked 
collector tor Intermountain Health Car* - nad 
a high school education, and v *-- retired :: " :> rmy and postal 
s*e: *• L 
education and worked ^ Gideon. iternationai no 
State failed to ask question- r.- n* iurors regarding 
spe
 x <: 
or * r ^ history. 
Additionally, the State used * + *• *wo remaining peremptory 
challenges to s*t . ,. 
working a Amerjca* Express - ^nd Ms, Registered 
Nurse ' r herefore *- - hh.it the Stnto wai 
actua, . concernec ..' amoun . jh ailijoj I-JHIUL . 
that the jury would hav^ strongly suggesting the pretextual 
ii 11 in in mi mi I tin UP c»tntr(|» reasons. 
Furthermore .-. , ^_ ;... _ . ^- .;,u:_ inherently 
discriminatory essence, the State argued that minorities 
* * .in ,. jurors 
than non-minorities - ..: high school educations. Such inherent 
and indirect discrimination was proscribed in Cantu II and cannot 
be a race neutral reason. 778 P.2d at 518-19 (court found that 
State's explanation, that hispanic juror was stricken because 
prosecutor was angry with defense for insisting on the inclusion 
of the juror, was not race neutral or legitimate). 
The examination of the factors above leads to the conclusion 
that the State's proposed explanation was merely a pretext and 
could not rebut Mr. Bingham's prima facie case. As no 
"legitimate11 race-neutral reason to strike Ms. Gonzales was 
given, and based upon the trial court's misapplication of the 
law, finding that Mr. Bingham was not a minority, the trial court 
erred in concluding that the prosecutor had given a race neutral 
reason and Mr. Bingham is entitled to a new trial. 
Applying the same factors to the State's explanation for 
striking Mr. Sampson, for the same reasons discussed in regard to 
Ms. Gonzales, the first and third factors do not apply. The 
second factor, "failure to examine the juror or perfunctory 
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing 
counsel had questioned the juror," again supports Mr. Bingham's 
position that the State's proposed explanation was merely a 
pretext. It should first be noted that the record shows no 
attempt on the part of the State to have Mr. Sampson excused for 
cause. The State asked no follow-up questions of Mr. Sampson and 
apparently determined that there was no for-cause reason to 
excuse Mr. Sampson. Since the State used its peremptory to 
strike Mr. Sampson, another minority, without attempting to have 
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the court excuse him for cause, asking any questions of Mr. 
Sampson whatsoe egarding Mr. Sampson 
is suspect. 
As r ' the fourth factor, the State's asserted concern over 
Mr. Sampson's joo si about his 
job than the case, appear^ - * related 
his factor bears ] ittle weight considering that 
the State showed i ic:> concern over 1: h i s • !!::< u : ill: I ;:i c A Jl : ii :i L j i;; ; 
questions or challenging Mr. Sampson for cause. 
, whether there were other jurors to which 
the reason could apply, shows that ML, II.I i I i ""I «n II ll 
jury, also had work responsibilities that she was worried about. 
regarding her concerns. 
This factor therefore furthei suggests a pretextual reason lor 
striking Mr. Sampson. 
B a s e d iiin m I I in I it i " . a p p a i ont l a r l 11 I i o n c e r n o v e r Mr. 
Sampson u n t i l making a peremptory cha l lengt ^ w 
q u e s t i o n i n g n • ha l l enge for cause , and the - r both Mr. 
Sampson i i ih1 a le i . wi i t • I i i r h n, 5 
a race neutral reasun rebutting the prim **j -*-••*: 
discrimination niirnl court erred iii concluding thar 
prosecutor gave ii i <i m mi iiil ifMsnii I i I r i k 11 ^mnc; 
Mr. Bingham should therefore receive a new t. rial. 
<-'• Under the Federal Constitutional Standard. Mr. Bingham 
has Proved that the State's Explanation Was Not Race Neutral. 
Bingham has also carried his burden *** -howing racial 
discrimination under the federal equal pre 
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discussed above, the State's explanation for striking Ms. 
Gonzales could have applied to three other non minority jurors 
who ultimately served on the jury. Moreover, because of the 
simple nature of the case and the evidence presented, it was 
disingenuous for the State to characterize it as complex and 
needing well educated jurors. 
Most important, in the proffered explanation, the prosecutor 
essentially explained that a hispanic woman with only a high 
school education did not have the mental ability to be a juror in 
this case, while non-minority jurors with only a high school 
education did. This explanation was inherently discriminatory 
and therefore could not be a "legitimate" reason under Batson. 
Therefore, Mr. Bingham met his burden of showing discrimination 
under the federal equal protection standards as well and should 
receive a new trial. 
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT VIOLATED MR. BINGHAM'S RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL AND 
MERITS REVERSAL 
In State v. Trov. the Utah Supreme Court delineated the test 
to be used to determine whether a prosecutor's misconduct has 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1984). That test was applied by this Court in the context of a 
prosecutor's misstatement of the law during closing argument: 
The test to determine whether a prosecutor's remarks 
have deprived a defendant of a fair trial and merit 
reversal in a criminal case is "did the remarks call to 
the attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in determining their 
verdict, and were they, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by those remarks." 
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State v, Bovatt.854 P.2d 550r 554-55 (Utah i\pp, ) , cert, denied. 
8 6 7 I I I • I! I I i IJ I 11111 i"; L a t e v . 1'ro \ h 1111 III,l• 2 c.J 4 8 3 , 486 
(Utah 1984)] A prosecutor's misstatement of the law necessarily 
calls the jury's attention matters that they would not be 
just I nd the i: efor s sat :i <! f p**>* +,,1h^ first prong 
of the Troy test i-rate v» Lopez, 789 P.2d Jtah App. 
1990)• 
In Mr. Bingham's 
was guilty onl\ :f : lawful Contrc i n *s Vehicle under Utah 
Code A,iniin 'in " *  * * - - \ misdemeanor, rather than 
Receiving Stolen Fropex 
degree felony, as ci arged *> State * **u- * Hiring 
c ] osi i lg argument, the prosecutor made the following statement: 
First of all, as you heard me just explain, unlawful 
control over a motor vehicle in the legal jargon is 
called joy-riding. Joy-riding is where, generally, a 
couple of kids see a motor vehicle, many cases just 
like this, at a convenience store, somebody's run in, 
left the motor running, the key's in there, they grab 
it, they drive over to a friend's house, they ride 
around town for a little bit and they abandon it within 
a 24-hour perioc 
I I i" f em** . ,", .,il. i.vtfrl f-he '"" 
prosecutor's characterization oi the law. Id. The court ruled: 
Well, he's arguing the application of those 
instructions. The objection#s overruled. You can deal 
with '•"hat in your rebuttal argument. 
P . 3 F * - D i . 
Contrary to the trial judge's ruling, the prosecute 1early 
m i s s t a t e d ! I In> I > I c c t 11 in I I I i t 
p a r t : 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to 
exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the 
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with 
intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful 
custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, 
or semitrailer. 
The only real distinction therefore from receiving stolen 
property is that the actor intends to deprive the owner of the 
vehicle "temporarily."4 More importantly, there is no mention 
of 24 hours in either statute. It was the jury, and not the 
prosecutor who was to determine whether the intention was to 
deprive temporarily or permanently. The prosecutor suggested 
that there was a 24 hour period involved. The prosecutor's 
misstatement therefore confused the very question the jury was to 
decide. 
The prosecutor also told the jury that in "legal jargon" it 
is called "joy-riding." The prosecutor then attempted to limit 
the statute to a common childhood or teen-age prank, again 
mischaracterizing the law and confusing the jury. Therefore, the 
first prong of the Troy test was met. 
Having shown that the prosecutor's remarks were improper, 
Mr. Bingham must show that the misleading statements probably 
4
 The Receiving Stolen Property statute requires that the 
defendant have an intent to "deprive." § 76-6-408(1). "Purpose to 
deprive" is defined in pertinent part in § 76-6-401(3) as: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
obj ect: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for 
so extended a period or to use under 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
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influenced the jury. Trov 688 P.2d at 486. In evaluating the 
effect of the improper statements, the court should look at the 
circumstances of the case as a whole, which includes an 
examination of the strength of the evidence against the 
defendant. Id. 
The State's proposed evidence upon which it relied to prove 
that Mr. Bingham intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle for 
more than a temporary basis was that Mr. Bingham had changed the 
license plate on the vehicle, and that he had covered a sticker 
on the vehicle. Mr. Bingham testified, giving reasons for both 
changing the license plate and covering the sticker. Under these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the evidence of Mr. 
Bingham's guilt was overwhelming and this Court should closely 
scrutinize the prosecutor's misconduct. Troy. 688 P.2d at 486. 
More important, during the jury's deliberation, the jury 
sent the following hand-written note to the court: 
Clarify 
(1) Is "permanent" [greater than or equal to sign] 24 
hours? 
(2) how long is "extended period of time"? 
R. 146. The trial judge sent the following hand-written note 
back in response: 
You will have to rely on your best judgment & the 
instructions in the law. 
ISI I I 
David S. Young 
R. 146. The jury's note demonstrated the difficulty which the 
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jury had with the temporary/permanent distinction and suggests 
the jury was confused by the prosecutor's statement that "joy-
riding" persons abandon the vehicle within 24 hours. 
The prosecutor's misstatement confused the law applicable to 
the crucial factual question in Mr. Bingham's case; whether he 
intended to keep the vehicle only temporarily. In the 
circumstances of Mr. Bingham's case, even a small degree of 
influence could have swayed the jury. See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. 
Finally, the trial court did not provide a curative 
instruction to the jury, See State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 300 
Utah 1988), and in fact, implied that the prosecutor was correct. 
Rather than sustaining the objection and instructing the jury to 
disregard the characterization and look only at the elements 
stated in the jury instruction, the trial court assisted the 
State in its erroneous characterization by condoning the 
statement and implying that it was correct. The second prong of 
the Troy test is therefore met and Mr. Bingham should receive a 
new trial. 
III. DISCUSSION BEFORE ENTIRE JURY VENIRE. REGARDING JUROR'S 
EXPOSURE TO MR. BINGHAM WHILE IN JAIL CLOTHES AND BEFORE 
ANOTHER COURT. DENIED MR. BINGHAM HIS RIGHT TO BE TRIED WITH 
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
It is well established that a defendant should not be 
compelled to appear at trial in jail clothing. Chess v. Smith. 
617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). That right is a fundamental right of 
constitutional magnitude. Id. at 344-45 (citing, Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). 
The rule is based upon the fundamental right of a defendant to be 
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tried with the presumption of innocence. 425 U.S. at 503. As 
recognized by this Court: 
Further, "[t]he presumption of innocence, although not 
articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component 
of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." 
[quoting, Estelle, 425 U.S. at 501] It necessarily 
follows from this that a criminal defendant is 
generally entitled to the "physical indicia of 
innocence." [citing, Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 
101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied. Kennedy v. 
Gray. 416 U.S. 959 (1974)] This indicia of innocence 
most often refers to the right of a criminal defendant 
to be tried in front of a jury in the "garb of 
innocence," rather than in prison clothing. [quoting, 
Kennedy. at 105. "The prejudicial effect that flows 
from a defendants appearing before a jury in 
identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is 
so potentially prejudicial as to create a substantial 
risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial." 
[quoting, Chess. 617 P.2d at 344] 
State v. Mitchell. 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991). This 
principle has been extended to a give the defendant a qualified 
right to appear in front of a jury without shackles or chains. 
Id. 
The question in Mr. Bingham's case is to what extent a 
defendant's fair trial rights require that he not be tried by a 
jury which has heard another juror relate her experience that she 
saw Mr. Bingham before another court, possibly on another case, 
and in jail clothes. The Utah Supreme Court has addressed a 
similar issue in the context of a juror who saw the defendant in 
handcuffs one morning before trial. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1993). With relatively little analysis, the court found 
that the defendant had not shown "any prejudice as a result of 
the encounter or that the verdict was in any way tainted by the 
effect of seeing him in handcuffs." Id. at 70. 
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In another case involving shackles, Dickson v. State, the 
defendant was transported to the courthouse in chains and was 
seen by at least one of the prospective jurors. 822 P.2d 1122, 
1123 (Nev. 1992). During the court's examination of the 
prospective jurors, this fact was discussed in front of all of 
the jurors. The court instructed the jurors not to allow the 
incident to effect them. Upon further questioning by defense 
counsel, one juror stated that it would be hard to weigh the 
evidence fairly due to the incident. 822 P.2d 1123. The Dickson 
court agreed that the incident infringed on the defendant's 
constitutional right to appear before the jury "clad in the 
apparel of an innocent person." Id. The court then applied a 
constitutional harmless error standard and found that the error 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
The present case is distinguishable from Wetzel and is 
factually similar to Dickson. While the Wetzel court could find 
no prejudice from the inadvertent observation of a defendant in 
shackles, prejudice is much more easily shown in Mr. Bingham's 
case. Estelle long ago established the immeasurable prejudice 
from a jury's observation of a defendant in prison clothes. 425 
U.S. at 504-05. The jury is no less likely to be effected by 
another juror's account of seeing the defendant in jail clothes 
at a prior occasion or by the discussion that he was before 
another court. 
In Mr. Bingham's case, Ms. DeRosier, the juror who had seen 
him in jail clothes, discussed her incident in front of all 
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potential jurors: 
Ms. DeRosier: I just saw Mr. Bingham at like a pre-trial a 
couple of weeks ago out in West Valley. I was just there in the 
courtroom. 
Judge Young: And are your acquainted with him in any way? 
Ms. DeRosier: No, I just— 
Judge Young: Just by coincidence you saw him, perhaps, in a 
proceeding relating to this, only an earlier proceeding; is that 
correct? 
Ms. DeRosier: Well, I don't know whether it is related to 
this case or not. It's where they go up and ask whether you're 
guilty or not guilty. He had a pre-trial, (emphasis added) 
Judge Young: It's probably an arraignment. And so an 
earlier proceeding. It's curious to me, that among the many 
people whom you would see there, why you would remember Mr. 
Bingham. Can you tell us how it is that you remember one person 
out of that group? Are you acquainted with Mr. Bingham? 
Ms. DeRosier: H, Huh-uh. Not at all. No. I just remember 
his face. 
Judge Young: You remember his face? 
Ms. DeRosier: He was dressed in — I guess they kept a few 
of 'em overnight in iail. (emphasis added) 
Judge Young: Uh-huh. 
R. 198-200. Following a bench conference, the trial court stated 
to the entire jury venire the reason for the conference, 
referring to jail clothes and stating that Mr. Bingham could have 
been appearing for some other case. R. 201-02. 
Although Ms. DeRosier was excused by the court and did not 
ultimately serve as a juror (R. 103), the damage was significant. 
Not only did she discuss Mr. Bingham wearing jail clothes and 
being held in jail for the night, but the other jurors could also 
have inferred that Mr. Bingham was appearing on another charge 
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unrelated and the trial judge instructed them as much. The trial 
judge could easily have remedied the situation at the time by 
dismissing the venire and calling a new pool of potential jurors. 
Instead, the trial court attempted to merely instruct the jurors 
that they should not consider the incident. The instruction 
actually added to the prejudice rather than dispelling it as the 
trial court emphasized the fact that Mr. Bingham had been in jail 
clothes, in jail and may have been appearing on a different 
matter. It was error and a violation of Mr. Bingham's rights to 
a fair trial to deny the motion for mistrial. 
As Mr. Bingham has shown a constitutional error, the burden 
shifts to the State to show that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
This infringement on Mr. Bingham#s right to be tried with the 
presumption of innocence was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Whether Mr. Bingham intended to take the vehicle only 
temporarily was a close question, one that prompted questions 
from the jury during deliberation. Thus, the jury could have 
been easily influenced by the prejudicial inferences to find Mr. 
Bingham guilty of the receiving stolen property rather than the 
lesser included offense. Mr. Bingham therefore is entitled to a 
new trial. 
REASONS SUPPORTING ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED DECISION 
Due to the complex nature of the issues involved, including 
the independent state constitutional analysis in Point I, Mr. 
Bingham believes that oral argument will materially assist this 
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Court in the resolution of this Appeal, Mr. Bingham therefore 
respectfully requests oral argument before this Court and 
requests that a published decision be issued. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, Mr. Bingham respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction for Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property and remand for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3** day o f J u lY' 1995. 
David V. Finlayson 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Richard P. Mauro 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, David V. Finlayson, hereby certify that I have 
caused eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
3s^1 day of July, 1995. 
David^VT Finlayson 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of July, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 24 
project did not unconstitutionally grant bene-
fits to private individuals; any benefits were 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-
mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises 
§ 9 to 23. 
C.J.S. — 37 CJ.S. Franchises § 26. 
Key Numbers. — Franchises «=> 11. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri- 26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Age of majority. 
Agent for service of process. 
Automobile license law. 
Construction with Art. VI, § 26. 
Contract carrier permit. 
Cosmetologists' license law. 
Criminal actions. 
—Investigations. 
—Prosecution. 
—Sentence. 
Criminal sentence. 
Disparate tax assessments. 
Excess revenue refunds. 
Guest statutes. 
Inheritance Tax Law. 
Insurance premium tax exemption. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Licenses. 
Massage parlor ordinance. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Notice requirements. 
Property. 
—Responsibility for water service. 
Public employees' retirement system. 
Public officers' bonds. 
Public officers' salaries. 
Road poll tax. 
School activities. 
Search warrants. 
Sunday closing laws. 
Tax sales. 
Unfair Practices Act. 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted. State v. 
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 
696 (1921). 
Objects and purposes of law present touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. & 
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 
(1941). 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such. 
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included, as 
compared to those excluded, provided differen-
tiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of 
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Before legislative enactment can be inter-
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas-
sification does not render statute unconstitu-
tional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimina-
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon unreason-
able distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948). 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
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41-la-1310 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(2) attempt to manipulate any of the levers, starting mechanism, 
brakes, or other mechanism or device of a motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer while the same is at rest and unattended; or 
(3) set in motion any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer while the 
same is at rest and unattended. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 117; C. 1943, The 1992 amendment, effective January 30, 
57-3a-118; 1991, ch. 241, § 44; C. 1953, 1992, renumbered this section, which formerly 
41-1-114; renumbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, appeared as § 41-1-114; inserted the subsec-
§ 166. tion designations; substituted "motor vehicle, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- trailer, or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "class places; and made stylistic changes. 
C" before "misdemeanor" at the end of the sec- Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
tion. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Burglary, breaking, or entering of 
motor vehicle, 72 A.L.R.4th 710. 
41-la-1310. Class B misdemeanors. 
It is a class B misdemeanor for any person to: 
(1) fail to properly endorse and deliver a valid certificate of title to a 
vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor to a transferee or owner lawfully enti-
tled to it in accordance with Section 41-la-702, except as provided for 
under Sections 41-3-301, 41-la-519, and 41-la-709; 
(2) fail to give an odometer disclosure statement to the transferee as 
required by Section 41-la-902; 
(3) operate, or cause to be operated, a motor vehicle knowing that the 
odometer is disconnected or nonfunctional, except while moving the mo-
tor vehicle to a place of repair; 
(4) offer for sale, sell, use, or install on any part of a motor vehicle or on 
an odometer in a motor vehicle any device that causes the odometer to 
register miles or kilometers other than the true miles or kilometers 
driven as registered by the odometer within the manufacturer's designed 
tolerance; 
(5) fail to adjust an odometer or affix a notice as required by Section 
41-la-906 regarding the adjustment; 
(6) remove, alter, or cause to be removed or altered any notice of adjust-
ment affixed to a motor vehicle as required by Section 41-la-906; 
(7) fail to record the odometer reading on the certificate of title at the 
time of transfer; or 
(8) accept or give an incomplete odometer statement when an odometer 
statement is-jrequired under Section 41-la-902. 
History: C. 1953, 41-1-173, enacted by L. tion (2) and inserted "replace" and "replaced" 
1986, ch. 103, § 7; 1989, ch. 274, § 41; 1990, in Subsections (2)(a) and (b). 
ch. 219, § 15; 1991, ch. 241, § 50; renum-
bered by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 167; 1992, ch. 218, The 1 9 9 0 amendment, effective April 23, 
§ 37. 1990, deleted "mileage" before "disclosure" in 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- Subsection (l)(a); substituted "miles or kilome-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted ters" for "mileage" in two places in Subsection 
"second degree" for "third degree" in Subsec- (l)(c); substituted "odometer reading" for 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-401 
Unloaded firearm. 1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
Aggravated robbery may be committed with 1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 R2d 1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (1989); 
387 (Utah 1977). State v. Russell, 791 R2d 188 (Utah 1990); 
^ j . «. . rv_.. „ 1 f t « „ J n , 0 /TT. u State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066 (Utah Ct. 
, J E X " ! " ! S t a t l \ 0 r t l Z ' ™? J * ? £ f M* App. 1992); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d U4 (Utah Ct. 1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246 (Utah
 A*J; l Q Q 9 . ' 
1985); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295 (Utah A p p* 1 W W " 
1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3. Admissibility of expert opinion stating 
CJJS. — 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 27. whether a particular knife was, or could have 
AJLR. — Fact that gun was unloaded as been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th 
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 660. 
507. Key Numbers. — Robbery «=» l l . 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions, 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the 
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) Tb restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) Tb dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
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76-6-401 CRIMINAL CODE 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe 
to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without 
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal 
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not 
a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend 
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-401. 
ANALYSIS 
Deception. 
Purpose to deprive. 
Cited. 
Deception. 
Subsection (a) in the definition of "deception" 
only applies to impressions of fact that are false 
at some present time; unfulfilled promises of 
future performance do not suffice as false rep-
resentations under that subsection. State v. 
Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Under Subsection (b) in the definition of 
"deception," the previously created or confirmed 
impression of fact must be false when the 
property is obtained in order to constitute "de-
ception." State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1983). 
Under Subsection (e) in the definition of 
"deception," a promise of future performance 
can constitute deception when the promising 
party does not intend to perform or knows the 
promise will not be performed; a person knows 
that a promise will not be performed when he is 
aware that the promise is reasonably certain 
not to be performed. State v. Lakey, 659 R2d 
1061 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant's false representations to a bank 
employee about his account and line of credit at 
other banks were sufficient to support finding 
of deception. State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). 
Purpose to deprive. 
Evidence was sufficient to establish defen-
dant's intent to deprive owner of his automobile 
where defendant drove the automobile in ex-
cess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from 
police; told police when stopped that he owned 
the automobile; damaged the automobile by 
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to Califor-
nia without ever stating he would return the 
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 
880 (Utah 1978). 
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was 
inferred from the following facts: in 1984, de-
fendant began borrowing small amounts of 
money from the victim to buy pet food; the 
victim's generosity prompted defendant to 
make subsequent requests for larger sums to 
pay for everything from automobile repairs to 
medical bills; with each request, defendant in-
evitably promised to repay the victim soon or by 
a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986, 
defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid 
only about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Cited in Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F. 
Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1986). 
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76-6-408 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 18. 
§ 101. Key Numbers. — Larceny <=» 10. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
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(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-408, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, § 1; 
1993, ch. 102, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "Sub-
section" for "paragraph* in Subsection (2), sub-
divided Subsection (2Xd), moved "if the value 
given for the property exceeds $20" which was 
formerly in Subsection (2XdXi) to the introduc-
tory language, inserted "picture" in Subsection 
(2)(dXiii), redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(d)(i) and (ii) as Subsections (3) and (4), 
inserted Subsection (5), making a correspond-
ing designation change, and made stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Pawnbrokers and sec-
ondhand dealers, § 11-6-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Applicability. 
Elements. 
—Concealing stolen property. 
—Receiving stolen property. 
Entrapment. 
Evidence. 
Intent. 
Prima facie case. 
Separate offenses. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
The presumption created in Subsection (2) is 
constitutional when read in light of § 76-1-503, 
which provides that a presumption means only 
that the issue of the presumed fact must be 
submitted to the jury unless its existence is 
clearly negated and that the jury may treat 
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the 
presumed fact, but does not disturb the require-
ment that the presumed fact, like all other 
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454 
(Utah 1976). 
The phrase "believing that it probably has 
been stolen" in Subsection (1), while not a 
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitution-
ally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah 
1976). 
Applicability. 
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits 
its application to pawnbrokers and similar 
businesses that generally deal in small pur-
chases of secondhand consumer goods. It does 
not include businesses that regularly deal in 
large bulk orders of raw industrial material. 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 
1993). 
Elements. 
—Concealing stolen property. 
The elements in the crime of concealing or 
aiding in the concealment of stolen property 
are: (1) property belonging to another has been 
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing 
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in 
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen; 
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the 
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606 
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980). 
—Receiving stolen property. 
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen 
property are: property belonging to another has 
been stolen; the defendant received, retained or 
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of 
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property 
the defendant knew or believed the property 
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely 
to deprive the owner of the possession of the 
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1980). 
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential 
element of the crime of receiving stolen prop-
erty; state's proof that offense occurred on a 
date different than that alleged in the informa-
tion was not fatal to defendant's conviction for 
receiving stolen property where the applicable 
limitations statute had not run at the time the 
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 R2d 394 
(Utah 1982). 
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by 
receiving, the state must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) The defendant received, retained, or dis-
posed of the property of another, (2) knowing 
that the property had been stolen or believing 
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v. 
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986). 
Entrapment. 
Trial court properly found entrapment in a 
"sting" operation involving use of an attractive 
female undercover police officer to sell stolen 
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may 
have been encouraged to suggest that his rela-
tionship with the officer become more intimate. 
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
Evidence establishing receiving stolen prop-
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